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A Most Unlikely God, by Barry Miller. Notre Dame IN: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1996. Viii + 168; From Existence to God, by Barry Miller.
London and New York: Routledge,1992. Pp. viii + 206.
DAVID B. BURRELL, C.S.C., University of Notre Dame
These two books by Barry Miller will soon form a triptych by the addition
of a third: "Exists" and Existence: Redundancy vs. Non-redundancy. (I shall
indicate from the manuscript how this final volume may flesh out issues
raised in the earlier two.) Unyielding in argument yet ever modest in his
formulations, Barry Miller might be dubbed the "master strategist" of philosophical theology. For he is crystal clear about his goal and the means to
that goal, yet always aware that the territory is mined with conceptual conflicts which are difficult to resolve, so he assurnes a minimal approach to
clarifying them, never asking more prior commitment from his interlocutors than is needed, yet demanding our attention throughout. His mode is
analytic, his range broad, and his sights high: the earlier volume (FETG)
offers a proof (from the principle of non-contradiction) that a cause of existence must exist, and how it must be constituted to cause something to exist;
the latter (AMUD) spells out the character of such a cause, taking on a formidable array of objections to such a One subsisting in itself or being ontologically simple. The "revolution" in ontological attitude which he must
work is the explicit theme of the final part of his endeavor (EAE): that far
from being the "thinnest" of attributes, existence is the richest of all attributes, and that by virtue of which an individual11as any other. Of course, he
must first show how "0 exists" is a first-level predicate as well as a unique
predication, which has been amply and effectively argued (against a formidable set of objectors) in the initial volume (FETG). That extended argument makes but one presumption: that essence and existence are distinct,
and that any existing thing is thereby "composed" of the two.
That composition is likened to the predication relation, so that
essence/existe11ce are constituents rather than components of an existing
entity, much as Aristotle modeled his matter/form relation on predication.
Yet Miller relies explicitly on Frege rather than Aristotle to make his point.
Indeed, the prevailing strategy of his argumentation is consistently to
en1ploy contemporary conceptual tools to displaya classical ontology. He
is coy about this goal, however, anxious as he is to bring readers along who
may kI10W little about these venerable traditions. At the heart of his initial
book lies a strategy for proving God's existence which assiduously avoids
any use of the "principle of sufficient reason" or the related "principle of
intelligibility." We readily associate the first with Leibniz, while those who
know his work could easily associate the second with the Canadian
philosopher and theologian, Bernard Lonergan. In search of the fewest
possible contested premises, however, Miller's strategy is to rely solelyon
the principle of non-contradiction, together with the aforementioned distinction between an existing thing's essence and its existence. Here is
where he must do the most work, of course, as he labors first to show how
"Oexists" can be a first level predicate (assigning areal property to
Socrates), and then how it must be unique among such predicates, since it
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cannot denominate an accident, for if Socrates is prior to his existing by
way of individuation, he can only be posterior to it by way of actuality.
(Here he must also eliminate residual traces of "platonism" by arguing
"tl'le inconceivability of future ll'ldividuals" [FETG 40-63].) Only then is he
free to show how the dual priorities of Socrates with regard to Socrates'
existence generate a contradiction unless a cause of Socrates' existing be
introduced; a cause which must exist, where the "necessary existence"
involved is more than logical, and best articulated by that being's essence
being to exist.
For it turns out that Socrates is [logicaIly] prior to Socrates' existence
with respect to individuality, yet posterior with respect to actuality. So
what makes Socrates' existence Llnique as a first-level property is precisely
that it must be prior to Socrates, whereas any other property depends on
Socrates. Whence then can such an existence come, if not from Socrates?
Only from "something external to hirn," which compels the conclusion:
"He exists inasmuch as he is caused to do so by something external to hirn,
and ultimately by a cause that is itself not caused to exist" (112). Yet even the
term "external" takes on new meaning here, since the very uncaused existence of this "cause of being" is, by virtue of this analysis, internal to the
existence of Socrates. Nor can such a one be an individual in an ordinary
sense, since individuals paradigmatically have their essence distinct from
their existence; so while the uniqueness of this cause can be demonstrated,
"it cannot be a concrete individual, or at least it cannot be an individual
except in an analogous sense of that term" (126-27). This extended argument concludes, thel'l, by reminding us how "the notion of Subsistent
Existence-a being which is not distinct from its essence-has turned out
to be indispensable" (151).
It is this very notion which is explored in exquisite detail in the sequel,
AMUG. The initial work is content to have established that one cannot
overlook the centrality or the import of something's existiI'lg: either by
treating existence as the actuality which "comes to" a possible being which
could adequately be referred to prior to its existing (so allowing existence
to be written off either as a "brute fact" or as a second-Ievel predicate), or
by failing to recognize how tl'le logical priority of existence to Socrates
makes of Socrates' existence an utterly unique first-level predicate, and Ol'le
which can be seen to require a cause other than Socrates for Socrates to
exist.
It is the second work (AMUG) which speIls out the Llniquely identifying
characteristics of this cause, this time more polen1ically by developing an
account which pinpoints the "falsity of the claims [of] perfect-being theologians and negative theologians alike 0 about the nature of God" (10). He
does this by distinguishing the limit of aseries simpliciter from its "limit
case," where the limit case functions like the circle to which aseries of
polygons with an increasing number of sides approaches, yet the circle is
not a polygon. So the limit case is not the final member of the series but
that to which the series as a whole points, where the capacity so to point
distances his treatment from a simple "negative theology," while the very
distinction of the limit case from the members of the pointing series aSSLlres
"the distinction" of creator from creatures which is the touchstone of classi-
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cal philosophical theology.l So by the deceptively simple device of a "limit
case," Miller manages to open aspace within which contested notions like
subsistent existence might receive their due philosophical hearing. And
with them, classical notions like divine simplicity, with the disarming corollary that " a sinlple God 0 is unlike creatures in never exercising [his
power] on anything, and thus his power is never anything but creative"
(13). This invites another strategy: "in talk about his causation, the causal
operator should always be used extemally: 0 not 'God makes the Universe
exist' but 'God makes it be that (the Universe exist)', not 'God acts on individual X to bring about F' but 'God brings it about that (X do F)' " (13).
Nor are these mere devices, but subtle strategies developed to distinguish
our discourse about the limit case (creator) from any other thing in the universe (creatures).
If these contentions be familiar to philosophical theologians working in
classical (and especially medieval) traditions, they are not only unfamiliar
to contemporary laborers in this arcane field, but bowdlerized versions of
them have regularly been mocked or trashed. So Miller's strategie skills
are constantly stretched to lead his interlocutors into a fresh considerations
of formulations which are at best unfamiliar and at worst have been subject
to crass misrepresentation. In that respect, the concluding chapter of the
third part (EAE), while characteristically modest, becomes quite ironie in
the light of the entire triptych: "Somewhat of a Revolutioll." For following
his careful arg-umentation will indeed lead one to a revolutionary way of
thinking about the most basic of issues, and may even prompt a kind of
conversion in those who thought these same issues had long been resolved
so as to preclude respectful consideration of classical positions and ways of
arguing. In that sense, Miller's work mayaIso be seen as an effort at
retrieval directed against implicitly Hegelian presuppositions regarding
the ways Ül which "we" have superceded earlier thinkers. Since that settled way of thinking has beeIL endemie to modernity, however, a closer
look at classical modes of thought-presented here in an utterly contemporary idiom-may offer his readers Olle more way of stepping beyond
modernity. It also offers a salient reminder of the ease with which pllilosophical theology can be co-opted by modern ways of thinking which have
themselves been developed-quite deliberately if IlOt always that explicitly-to frame a universe absent the "hypothesis" of a creator. Indeed, nothing displays this better than the contrast between an impoverished or an
abundant notion of existence.
While this difference forms the explicit theme of his third manuscript, it
already figures centrally in his attempt to retrieve a classical notion of the
creator in AMUG. The strategy turns on the notion of abound, and the initially paradoxical proposal that "an object's existence [be] recognized as
bounded by the object" (70). More explicitly: "so long as an object's existence was conceived of as a being inhering in the object, any ontological
richness possessed by the existing object could only have been attributed to
the object rather than to its existence." But if existence is the first-level property which ordinary discourse presumes it to be, and for which Miller has
strenuously argued, it would be incoherent to think of it as attributed to
something which does not exist. So he proposes that "that assumption be
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jettisoned and an object's existence [be] recognized as bounded by the
object." For then "its existence lLas to be accepted as more or less rich,
depending on the extent to which it is contracted by the individual that
both bounds it and individuates it: the less restrictive the bound, the richer
the instance of existence that is individuated by it." The limit case would
then be subsistent existence: "quite literally 'rich beyolLd all bounds'." His
earlier discussion of the ways in which Socrates and Socrates' existence are
respectively prior one to another, whether one be focusing on individuality
or on actuality, prepared us for this startling suggestion, as did the manner
in which the first-level predicate "0 exists" must differ from any non-existential predication.
Yet Miller saves further discussion of his strategy of bound for the final
volume, moving on here (in AMUG) to consider in detail the ontological
simpleness for which "subsistent existence" provides the necessary condition (80). Here he must contend with a formidable array of objections,
negotiating thenl with a single-minded consistency which aHows hirn to
portray creation as the limit case of power: "the limit towards which these
series of powers is pointing is apower that is utterly impervious to the
absence of anything on which to operate" (88), so that "what might have
been thought of as an intervention in the Universe would not be an operation on something that, once having been created, existed in its own right
at every moment thereafter. Rather it would be simply the continuiILg creation of the Universe that was now in some modified state relative to its
immediately preceding one" (88-89). In fact, nothing but ontological simpleness can assure the distinction of creator from creatures: "only a being
that is identical with its existence (and hence with its other real properties)
can be the creator of the Universe" (94, n.11). Finally, divine sinlplicity
requires a stringent alteration of ordinary modal strategies, since such a
One has no powers in the sense of abilities: "God does know, understand,
will, and create, but he does so without engaging any correlative ability.
Likewise, though his is free, he exercises that freedom without engaging in
any ability to choose. So, when we accept that he differs absolutely from
creatures, we need to be aware of exactly what that precludes us from saying. In particular, it precludes most of the claims nlade so freely by perfect-being theologians, who seem to have no qualms about depicting God
as nlaking choices, as having the ability to create a universe different from
our own, as one whose creative activity, knowledge, and ulLderstanding
are the exercise of his abilities to create, know, and understand respectively, and who acts on his creatures as they themselves act on each other ° .
Anselmians are so far under the speIl of anthroponl0rphism as to fail to
realize that this way of depicting the creator of the Universe is not merely
false, it is positively bizarre" (167-68).
The striking way in which this concluding salvo contrasts with the careful argumentation throughout all of these volumes should help us to
appreciate Barry MiHer's sustained motivation, as weH as remind us that
the presumptions he is exploding have formed the stock-in-trade of much
of the recently touted resurgence of "plLilosophy of religion." In the face of
a set of presunlptiolLS prevailing like dogmas in that arena, he concludes:
"the doctrine of divine simplicity has therefore proved not only to be
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entirely intelligible and defensible, but to be crucial in making available to
us an understanding of God as being transcendent in a way that, for different reasons, has so eluded Anselmians and negative theologians alike.
What they, and process theologians too, have thought to be a most unlikely
God is in fact the God who created us" (168). Challenges like that deserve
the closest possible attention, even if that should lead us to question many
a cherished presumption. Moreover, those whom Barry Miller's work may
have encouraged to give classical formulations a second look, even to
acknowledge the sophistication they can bring to current debate, would
profit by Harm J. M. J. Goris' Free Creatures of an Eternal God (Leuven:
Peeters, 1996), which also engages contemporary analytic discussions; and
in a more theological vein, Thomas Weinandy's recent Does God Suffer?
(Notre Dame IN; University of Notre Dame Press, 2000).
NOTES
1. For alueid aeeount of the implieations for faith and for philosophy of
"the distinetion" of ereator from ereatures, see Robert Sokolowski, God of Faith
and Reason (Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982 /
Washington DC: Catholie University of Ameriean Press, 1993)

Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas, by John I. Jenkins, C.S.C.
Cambridge, 1997, Pp. xv, 267.
PATRICK LEE, Franciscan University of Steubenville.
Aquinas's doctrines on knowledge and faith, Jenkins argues, have been
misunderstood. He has been read as if answerin.g modern questions, and
so his own "conceptual framework" has been largely ignored. Specifically,
many have misunderstood Aquinas's view of scientia and how that affects
his views of theology (sacra doctrina), the purpose and structure of the
SUl1zma Theologiae, and the light of faith. His book is an attempt to remedy
these defects.
The book covers a lot of ground, and does so interestingly and competently. The reader will find treated here not only the subjects just n1entioned, but also Aquinas's basic theories of epistemology, free choice,
nature, will, appetite, and principles of naturallaw.
The main task of the book is to explain how according to Aquinas theol- .
ogy is a scientia, or an Aristotelian episteme. This has more than antiquarian
interest. Aquinas's view of theology at first seems rather dry: to say it is a
science, even in the Aristotelian sense, seems a straight-jacket. But when
one understands how according to Aquinas theology is a sharing in the scientia of God himself, Aquinas's position emerges as both an exalted view
of theology's dignity and a frank acknowledgn1ent of its limitations.
According to Aquinas, following Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, scientia is
an understanding of why things have the necessary properties they havean understanding "not just of the fact, but of the reasoned fact." For exampIe, to know that metals readily conduct heat and electricity is not scientia,

